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Abstract
We study the eciency of mechanisms for allocating a divisible resource. Given scalar signals
submied by all users, such a mechanism decides the fraction of the resource that each user will receive
and a payment that will be collected from her. Users are self-interested and aim tomaximize their utility
(dened as their value for the resource fraction they receive minus their payment). Starting with the
seminal work of Johari and Tsitsiklis [Mathematics of Operations Research, 2004], a long list of papers
studied the price of anarchy (in terms of the social welfare— the total users’ value) of resource allocation
mechanisms for a variety of allocation and payment rules. Here, we further assume that each user has a
budget constraint that invalidates strategies that yield a payment that is higher than the user’s budget.
is subtle assumption, which is arguably more realistic, constitutes the traditional price of anarchy
analysis meaningless as the set of equilibria may change drastically and their social welfare can be
arbitrarily far from optimal. Instead, we study the price of anarchy using the liquid welfare benchmark
that measures eciency taking budget constraints into account. We show a tight bound of 2 on the
liquid price of anarchy of the well-known Kelly mechanism and prove that this result is essentially best
possible among all multi-user resource allocation mechanisms. is comes in sharp contrast to the
no-budget seing where there are mechanisms that considerably outperform Kelly in terms of social
welfare and even achieve full eciency. In our proofs, we exploit the particular structure of worst-
case games and equilibria, which also allows us to design (nearly) optimal two-player mechanisms by
solving simple dierential equations.
1 Introduction
Resource allocation is an ubiquitous task in computing systems and oen sets algorithmic challenges to
their design. As such, resource allocation problems have received much aention by the algorithmic com-
munity for decades. e recent emergence of large-scale distributed systems with non-cooperative users
that compete for access to scarce resources has led to game-theoretic treatments of resource allocation.
In this paper, we study a particular simple class of resource allocationmechanisms that aim to distribute a
divisible resource (such as bandwidth of a communication link, CPU time, storage space, etc.) by auctioning
it o to dierent users as follows. Each user is asked to submit a scalar signal. Given the submied
signals, the mechanism decides the fraction of the resource that will be allocated to each user, as well as
the payment that will be received from each of them. A typical example is a mechanism that has been
proposed by Kelly [1997] (henceforth called the Kelly mechanism; see also [Kelly et al., 1998]), according
to which the fraction of the resource allocated to each user is proportional to the user’s signal, and the
signal itself is her payment.
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e users are self-interested. Following the standard modeling assumptions in the related literature,
the value of each user for a resource fraction is given by a private valuation function. e above denition
of resource allocation mechanisms allows the users to act strategically in the sense that the signal they
select to submit is such that their utility (value for the fraction of the resource they receive minus payment)
is maximized. Naturally, this behavior denes a strategic game among the users, who act as players. Soon
aer the denition of the Kelly mechanism, a series of papers studied the existence and uniqueness of
pure Nash equilibria (snapshots of player strategies, in which the signal of each player maximizes her own
utility) of the induced games [Hajek and Gopalakrishnan, 2002; La and Anantharam, 2000; Maheswaran
and Basar, 2003] and quantied their ineciency [Johari and Tsitsiklis, 2004] using the notion of the price
of anarchy [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999].
In particular, Johari and Tsitsiklis [2004] used the social welfare (i.e., the total value of the players for
their received fraction of the resource) as an eciency benchmark and proved that the social welfare at
any equilibrium is at least 3/4 times the optimal social welfare. is translates into a price of anarchy
bound of 4/3, which is tight. e paper of Johari and Tsitsiklis [2004] sparked subsequent research on
other resource allocation mechanisms, that use dierent (non-proportional) allocation rules or payments.
A rst apparent question was whether improved price of anarchy bounds are possible by changing the
allocation function, but keeping the simple pay-your-signal (or PYS, for short) payment rule. Sanghavi and
Hajek [2004] showed that no PYS mechanism has price of anarchy beer than 8/7, designed an allocation
function that achieves this bound for two players, and provided strong experimental evidence that a slightly
inferior bound holds for arbitrarily many players. Surprisingly, full eciency at equilibria (i.e., a price
of anarchy equal to 1) is possible via dierent allocation/payment functions. is discovery was made
in three independent papers by Maheswaran and Basar [2006], Yang and Hajek [2007], and Johari and
Tsitsiklis [2009]. e mechanism of Maheswaran and Basar [2006] uses proportional allocation (but a
dierent payment; see Section 2 for its description), while the mechanisms of Johari and Tsitsiklis [2009]
and Yang and Hajek [2007] are adaptations of the well-known VCG paradigm (see also the survey by Johari
[2007] on these results).
Our focus in the current paper is on the —arguably, more realistic— seing, in which each player has
a private budget that constrains the payments that she can aord and, consequently, narrows her strategy
space. As resource allocation mechanisms do not have direct access to budgets, budget constraints can
restrict the set of equilibria so that their social welfare is extremely low compared to the optimal social
welfare, which in turn is not related to player strategies, payments, or budgets. An eciency benchmark
that is suitable for budget-constrained players is known as liquid welfare (introduced by Dobzinski and
Paes Leme [2014] and, independently, by Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] who call it eective welfare) and is
obtained by slightly changing the denition of the social welfare, taking budgets into account. Informally,
the liquid welfare is the total value of the players for the resource fraction they receive, with the value of
each player capped by her budget.
Dobzinski and Paes Leme [2014] provide the following justication of liquid welfare as a natural ex-
tension of a revenue-motivated interpretation of social welfare. In the no-budget seing, besides simply
viewing the social welfare as the total utility of all players and the mechanism combined, we can also
interpret it as an upper bound on the revenue that the mechanism can hope to gain by “selling” fractions
of the resource to the players. In the seing with budgets, the liquid welfare admits the same interpreta-
tion. If the value of a player exceeds her budget, then the maximum revenue is the budget (which restricts
what she can aord). On the other hand, if the budget exceeds her value, then the value is the maximum
revenue as if there was no budget constraint. Combining these together, we get that the maximum rev-
enue is the minimum between these two, which gives rise to the denition of liquid welfare, by summing
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Mechanism LPoA Comment
all ≥ 2− 1/n No mechanism can achieve full eciency (eorem 3.1)
Kelly 2 Tight bound; almost optimal among alln-playermechanisms (eorem
5.1)
SH 3 Tight bound (eorems 5.2 and 5.3)
E2-PYS 1.792 Tight bound (eorem 6.1); optimal among all 2-player PYS mecha-
nisms with concave allocation functions (eorem 6.2)
E2-SR ≤ 1.529 Almost optimal among all 2-player mechanisms (eorem 6.3)
SH-SR 1.618 Tight bound (eorem 6.4)
Table 1: Summary of our liquid price of anarchy bounds for resource allocation mechanisms for budget-
constrained users. e last three mechanisms are specically for two players. e term “tight bound”
means that the analysis of the corresponding mechanism is tight.
over all players. In addition, Dobzinski and Paes Leme [2014] compare liquid welfare to other benchmarks
previously used in the literature.
Following the recent paper of Azar et al. [2017], we use the term liquid price of anarchy (and abbreviate
it as LPoA) to refer to the price of anarchy with respect to the liquid welfare, i.e., the ratio between the
optimal liquid welfare of a game induced by a resource allocation mechanism and the worst liquid welfare
over all equilibria of the game.
Our results and techniques. We aim to explore all resource allocation mechanisms and nd the mech-
anism with the best possible LPoA. Our results suggest a drastically dierent picture compared to the no-
budget seing. First, the analogue of full eciency is not achievable; we show a lower bound of 2 − 1/n
on the LPoA of any n-player resource allocation mechanism (under standard technical assumptions for
player valuations and mechanism characteristics; see Section 2). e Kelly mechanism is proved to have
an almost best possible LPoA of exactly 2. In contrast, the mechanism of Sanghavi and Hajek [2004]
(henceforth called SH) has an LPoA of 3. Improved bounds are possible for two players. We design the
two-player PYS resource allocation mechanism E2-PYS that has an LPoA of 1.792; this bound is optimal
among a very broad class of mechanisms. We also design the two-player mechanism E2-SR that achieves
an almost optimal LPoA bound of at most 1.529; this mechanism uses dierent payments. We also present
a simpler 2-player mechanism, which combines the allocation function of SH and the payment function
of E2-SR, and achieves a tight LPoA bound of φ = 1.618. See Table 1 for a summary of our results.
Our results exploit a particular structure of worst-case (in terms of LPoA) games and their equilibria.
We prove that for every resource allocation mechanism, the worst-case LPoA is obtained at instances in
which players have ane valuation functions. In addition, all players besides one have nite budgets and
play strategies that imply payments that are either zero or equal to their budget, while a single player
has innite budget and a signal that nullies the derivative of her utility. Compared to an analogous
characterization for the no-budget case (with linear valuation functions and player signals that all nullify
their utility derivatives), rst observed by Johari and Tsitsiklis [2004] for the Kelly mechanism and later
extended to all resource allocation mechanisms, the structure in our characterization is much richer and
the proof is considerably more complicated. e characterization contains so much information that the
LPoA bounds follow rather easily; the extreme example is the proof of our best LPoA bound of 2 for the
Kelly mechanism which is only a few lines long. It can also be used in the design of new mechanisms;
for example, the design and analysis of our two-player mechanisms E2-PYS and E2-SR follow by simple
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rst-order dierential equations, which would never have been identied without our characterization.
And, furthermore, under assumptions about the resource allocation mechanisms (e.g., concave allocations
and convex payments), the LPoA bound is automatically proved to be tight without providing any explicit
lower bound instance.
Other related work. As an eciency benchmark, liquid welfare has been studied recently in dierent
contexts such as in the design of truthful mechanisms (see [Dobzinski and Paes Leme, 2014; Lu and Xiao,
2015, 2017]) and in the analysis of combinatorial Walrasian equilibria with budgets [Dughmi et al., 2016].
In the context of the price of anarchy, it was considered recently in simultaneous rst price auctions by
Azar et al. [2017] and in position auctions by Voudouris [2019].
Caragiannis and Voudouris [2016] were the rst to prove that the liquid price of anarchy of the Kelly
mechanism is constant. In particular, they showed LPoA upper and lower bounds of 2.78 and 2, respec-
tively. e lower bound is essentially proved again here (see eorem 5.1) with a completely dierent
and more interesting technique. Christodoulou et al. [2016] improved the LPoA upper bound to 2.618
and extended the results to more general seings involving multiple resources. Prior to these two papers,
Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] proved that the social welfare at equilibria of the Kelly mechanism is at most
a constant factor away from the optimal liquid welfare. In contrast to the analysis techniques in the cur-
rent paper, the analysis of the Kelly mechanism by Caragiannis and Voudouris [2016], Christodoulou et
al. [2016] and Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] is closer in spirit to the smoothness template (see [Roughgar-
den, 2015; Roughgarden et al., 2017]) and is based on bounding the utility of each player by the utility she
would have when deviating to appropriate signal strategies. eir results hold for more general equilib-
rium concepts such as coarse-correlated or Bayes-Nash equilibria. Our LPoA bounds in the current paper
hold specically for pure Nash equilibria, but are superior and tight.
Roadmap. e rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with denitions and notation in
Section 2. Our lower bound on the LPoA of any resource allocation mechanism appears in Section 3.
Section 4 is devoted to proving the structural characterization of worst-case resource allocation games
and equilibria. en, in Section 5 we present tight bounds on the liquid price of anarchy for the Kelly
and SH mechanisms. In Section 6, we present our two-player mechanisms E2-PYS, E2-SR and SH-SR. We
conclude with open problems and a discussion on possible extensions in Section 7.
2 Denitions and notation
We consider a single divisible resource of unit size that is distributed among n users by a resource allocation
mechanismM . e mechanismM consists of
• an allocation function gM : Rn≥0 → Q ∪ 0, where Q = {d ∈ [0, 1]n :
∑n
i=1 di = 1} is the unit
n-simplex and 0 = (0, ..., 0), and
• a payment function pM : Rn≥0 → Rn≥0,
and works as follows. Each user i submits a signal si ∈ R≥0, and the mechanismM allocates a fraction
of gMi (s) of the resource to each user i and asks her for a payment of pMi (s), where s = (s1, ..., sn)
denotes the vector formed by all signals. Clearly, gMi and pMi are the i-th entries of vectors gM and pM ,
respectively.
Some important properties of allocation and payment functions are as follows:
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• ey are anonymous: any permutation of the entries of the input signal vector results in the same
permutation of the output. So, all users get equal resource shares and are asked for equal payments
when they submit identical signals;
• e mechanism does not allocate any fraction and does not ask for any payment from a user that
submits a zero signal;
Let (y, s−i) denote the signal vector in which user i has signal y and the remaining users have their
signals as in s. Viewed as univariate functions (of variable y), the functions gMi (y, s−i) and pMi (y, s−i)
are increasing (with the exception of (y, s−i) = (y,0−i) where gMi (y,0−i) = 1) and dierentiable in R≥0
(with the exception of (y, s−i) = 0). e above are characteristics that all known mechanisms in the
resource allocation literature have (e.g., see [Johari, 2007; Johari and Tsitsiklis, 2004, 2009; Maheswaran
and Basar, 2003; Sanghavi and Hajek, 2004; Yang and Hajek, 2007]).
Each user i has
• a monotone non-decreasing, concave, and dierentiable valuation function vi : [0, 1] → R≥0, 1 so
that vi(x) represents the value that user i has for a resource fraction of x;
• a private budget ci ∈ R≥0 ∪ {+∞}, which restricts (upper-bounds) her payment to the mechanism.
Her utility from the mechanism is dened as the value she gets for the fraction she is given minus her
payment, i.e.,
uMi (s) = vi
(
gMi (s)
)− pMi (s).
To capture the fact that budgets impose hard constraints to the users, we technically assume that uMi (s) =
−∞ when pMi (s) > ci.
e users act strategically as utility maximizers and, therefore, engage as players into a strategic re-
source allocation game GM that is induced by mechanismM . A (pure Nash) equilibrium is a signal vector
s such that, when viewed as a univariate function of variable y, uMi (y, s−i) is maximized for y = si, i.e.,
no player can increase her utility by unilaterally deviating to submiing a dierent signal. We denote by
eq(GM ) the set of all equilibria of game GM .
Due to the budget constraints, we have three dierent cases for the strategy of player i at an equilibrium
s ∈ eq(GM ) (assuming a non-trivial budget ci > 0) and for the corresponding value of the derivative of her
utility. In particular, the derivative ∂u
M
i (y,s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=si
is equal to zero in case si is such that 0 < pMi (s) < ci,
non-positive in case si = 0, and non-negative in case si is such that pMi (s) = ci. Note that nullication of
the utility derivative does not necessarily imply maximization of utility.
We argue, using the denition and properties of the allocation and payment functions, that signal
vectors with at most one positive entry cannot be equilibria. is is clearly the case for the signal vector
0. Indeed, any player i with positive budget and valuation function that takes positive values has the
incentive to unilaterally deviate to submiing a suciently small signal, so that the mechanism gives her
the whole resource and asks for a payment of, say, vi(1)/2; this is due to the continuity of the payment
function and the fact that it is equal to zero on input the signal vector 0. Actually, player i has an incentive
to further decrease her payment. At some point, she will deviate to a signal δ > 0 so that the payment of
1Note that we do not assume that the valuation functions are normalized and it might be the case that vi(0) 6= 0 for some
player i, which is quite uncommon in the related literature. However, observe that any concave function v with an oset of α > 0
(i.e., v(0) = α) can be approximated by another concave function v˜ with no oset (i.e., v˜(0) = 0) but slope large enough so that
v˜() = v() for some arbitrarily small  > 0; x ≥ , the two functions v and v˜ have values that coincide.
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another player j when both i and j have a signal equal to δ is, say, strictly less than vj(1/2). At that point,
player j will also deviate to the positive signal δ and get half of the resource and positive utility.2 We use
Xn as an abbreviation of the subset of Rn≥0 consisting of signal vectors with at least two strictly positive
entries.
We are interested in studying the eect of the strategic behavior on the eciency of resource allocation
mechanisms. An eciency benchmark that has been used extensively in the related literature is social
welfare. For an allocation d ∈ Q ∪ 0 of a resource allocation game GM , the social welfare is dened as
SW(d,GM ) =
n∑
i=1
vi(di),
where n is the number of players in GM and vi is the valuation function of player i. en, the ineciency
of equilibria of game GM can be measured by its price of anarchy which is dened as
PoA(GM ) = sup
s∈eq(GM )
SW∗(GM )
SW(gM (s),GM ) ,
where SW∗(GM ) denotes the maximum social welfare over all allocations of GM .
However, the denition of the social welfare does not take into account the possibly nite budgets that
the players may have. erefore, we instead use the liquid welfare as our eciency benchmark. e liquid
welfare of an allocation d is dened as
LW(d,GM ) =
n∑
i=1
min{vi(di), ci},
where ci is the budget of player i. Clearly, when players have no budget constraints, the liquid welfare
coincides with the social welfare. e liquid price of anarchy of a resource allocation game GM is then
dened as
LPoA(GM ) = sup
s∈eq(GM )
LW∗(GM )
LW(gM (s),GM ) ,
where LW∗(GM ) denotes the maximum liquid welfare over all allocations of game GM . We use the over-
loaded term LPoA(M) to denote the liquid price of anarchy of the resource allocation mechanismM . is
is dened as the maximum (or, more formally, the supremum) liquid price of anarchy over all games that
are induced by mechanismM .
2.1 Examples of resource allocation mechanisms
Let us devote some space to the denition of some well-knownmechanisms from the literature. An impor-
tant class of resource allocation mechanisms is that of pay-your-signalmechanisms (PYS, for short). When
at least two players submit non-zero signals, a PYS mechanism charges each player i a payment equal to
the signal si that she submits. Otherwise, PYS mechanisms follow the general convention that we have
dened at the beginning of Section 2, and do not charge any payment to any player.
2In general, we consider games in which at least two players have strictly positive budgets and valuation functions that take
non-zero values.
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e most popular PYS mechanism is the Kelly mechanism that was introduced in [Kelly, 1997]. is
mechanism allocates the resource proportionally to the players’ signals (this is why it is also known as the
proportional allocation mechanism in the related literature), i.e.,
g
Kelly
i (s) =
si∑n
j=1 sj
.
eKelly mechanism has played a central role in the related literature; for the no-budget seing, Johari
and Tsitsiklis [2004] proved that its price of anarchy is 4/3. In their aempt to design the PYS mechanism
with the lowest possible price of anarchy, Sanghavi and Hajek [2004] dened the allocation function
gSHi (s) =
si
max`{s`}
∫ 1
0
∏
j 6=i
(
1− sj
max`{s`} t
)
dt.
Wewill refer to the PYS mechanism that uses this allocation function as SH. For two players, the allocation
function has a very simple denition as gSH1 (s) = s12s2 when s1 ≤ s2, and gSH1 (s) = 1 − s22s1 otherwise.
Sanghavi andHajek [2004] proved that the two-player version of the SHmechanism has an optimal (among
all PYS mechanisms) price of anarchy of 8/7 and provided experimental evidence that the price of anarchy
of the n-player version is only marginally higher. As we will see later in Section 5, the comparison between
Kelly and SH yields a drastically dierent result when players have budgets and the liquid welfare is used
as the eciency benchmark.
Other interesting classes of mechanisms use proportional allocation, but dierent kinds of payments.
Among them, a mechanism dened by Maheswaran and Basar [2006] uses the class of payment functions
pMi (s) =
∑
j 6=i
sj
 · ∫ si
0
hM (t+
∑
j 6=i sj)
(t+
∑
j 6=i sj)2
dt,
where hM : R≥0 → R≥0 is an increasing function (such as hM (z) = z; several other choices for hM have
been suggested in [Maheswaran and Basar, 2006]). ese mechanisms have the remarkable property of full
eciency at equilibria in the no-budget seing (i.e., they have price of anarchy equal to 1). Independently
fromMaheswaran and Basar [2006], Johari and Tsitsiklis [2009] as well as Yang and Hajek [2007] presented
resource allocation mechanisms that achieve full eciency in the no-budget seing. All these mechanisms
can be thought of as adaptations of the well-known VCG paradigm.
3 A lower bound for all mechanisms
e fact that the mechanisms of [Maheswaran and Basar, 2006; Johari and Tsitsiklis, 2009; Yang and Hajek,
2007] achieve full eciency seems quite surprising, since resource allocation mechanisms do not have
direct access to the valuation functions of the players. e denition of these mechanisms is such that
the incentives of the players are fully aligned to the global goal of maximizing the social welfare. In a
sense, these mechanisms manage to achieve access to the valuation functions indirectly. In contrast, when
players have budget constraints, we show below that a liquid price of anarchy equal to 1 is not possible.
is means that resource allocation mechanisms fail to “mine” any kind of information about the budget
values of the players, while budgets aect the strategic behavior of the players crucially.3
3One might wonder whether this inability of resource allocation mechanisms is due to the restriction that each player submits
a single scalar signal to the mechanism. is is not true, as we discuss in Section 7. In particular, we show that the lower bound
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0 di∗ 1
0
di∗
1
vi∗ (x ) = x
0 di 1
0
di
1
2di
vi (x ) = x
v˜i (x ) = di + x
Figure 1: A graphical representation of the games used in the proof of eorem 3.1. e two gures depict
the valuation functions of players i∗ and i 6= i∗ in games GM1 and GM2 . e blue points (i.e., point (di∗ , di∗)
in the le gure, and points (di, di) and (di, 2di) in the right gure) represent the equilibrium in both
games, and the optimal allocation in game GM1 . e optimal allocation in GM2 is represented by the red
points (i.e., point (1, 1) in the le gure and point (0, di) in the right one).
eorem 3.1. Every n-player resource allocation mechanism has liquid price of anarchy at least 2− 1/n.
Proof. Let M be any n-player resource allocation mechanism that uses an allocation function gM and a
payment function pM . Let s = (s1, ..., sn) be an equilibrium of the game GM1 induced byM for players
with valuations vi(x) = x and budgets ci = +∞, for every i ∈ [n]. Assume that the allocation returned
by M at this equilibrium is d = (d1, ..., dn). Since all players have the same linear valuation function
and none of them has a budget constraint, any allocation (equilibrium or not) achieves the same liquid (or
social) welfare, and hence LPoA(GM1 ) = 1.
Recall that, for every signal vector y = (y1, ..., yn), the utility of player i is dened as uMi (y) =
vi(g
M
i (y))− pMi (y). Now, let i∗ = arg mini di (hence, di∗ ≤ 1/n) and consider the game GM2 where each
player i 6= i∗ has the modied valuation function v˜i(x) = di + x and budget c˜i = di, while player i∗ is as
in GM1 (see Figure 1). Observe that the modied utility of player i 6= i∗ as a function of a signal vector y is
now u˜Mi (y) = v˜i(gMi (y))− pMi (y) = uMi (y) + di. Also, since the utility of player i 6= i∗ is non-negative
at the equilibrium s of game GM1 , we have that pMi (s) ≤ di = c˜i, meaning that player i can also aord this
payment in game GM2 . Hence, s is an equilibrium in GM2 as well (and, again,M returns the same allocation
d).4
Its liquid welfare is
∑
i min{v˜i(di), c˜i} = min{di∗ ,+∞} +
∑
i 6=i∗ min{2di, di} =
∑
i di = 1, while
the optimal liquid welfare is at least 1 +
∑
i 6=i∗ di, achieved at the allocation according to which the whole
resource is given to player i∗. Hence, we conclude that the liquid price of anarchy ofM is LPoA(M) ≥
LPoA(GM2 ) ≥ 1 +
∑
i 6=i∗ di = 2− di∗ ≥ 2− 1/n, as desired.
of 2− 1/n holds even if the players submit multidimensional signals, which could be used to encode detailed information about
their valuation functions and budgets. Moreover, in Section 7, we show a slightly weaker lower bound even for mechanisms that
know the budgets of the players a priori.
4We remark that the conclusion di∗ ≤ 1/n can be drawn from the assumption∑ni=1 di ≤ 1. Hence, the proof of eorem 3.1
holds even for mechanisms that do not allocate the whole resource to the players. We will not consider this variation further,
since no improvement of our positive results seems to be possible in this way.
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4 e structure of worst-case games and equilibria
In this section, we prove our structural characterization. Given an n-player resource allocation mechanism
M (with allocation and payment functions gM and pM , respectively), signal vector s ∈ Xn, and an integer
j ∈ [n], dene the n-player game GM (s, j) as follows. Every player has the ane valuation function
v˜i(z) = λ
M
i (s) · z + κMi (s) and budget c˜i, where5
λMi (s) =
(
∂gMi (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=si
)−1
· ∂p
M
i (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=si
and κMj (s) = 0, c˜j = +∞, and κMi (s) = c˜i = pMi (s) for every player i 6= j.
Let us give an example. Let s ∈ Xn be any signal vector and consider the Kelly mechanism, which
allocates to player i a fraction gKellyi (s) =
si
si+
∑
t6=i st
and requires a payment pKellyi (s) = si. Since
∂g
Kelly
i (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣∣
y=si
=
∑
t6=i st(
si +
∑
t6=i st
)2
and
∂p
Kelly
i (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣∣
y=si
= 1
we have that
λ
Kelly
i (s) =
(
∂gMi (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=si
)−1
· ∂p
M
i (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=si
=
(
si +
∑
t6=i st
)2∑
t6=i st
.
erefore, in game GKelly(s, j), player j has budget c˜j = +∞ and valuation function
v˜j(z) =
(
sj +
∑
t6=j st
)2∑
t6=j st
· z.
Any other player i 6= j has budget c˜i = pKellyi (s) = si and valuation function
v˜i(z) =
(
si +
∑
t6=i st
)2∑
t6=i st
· z + si.
In Lemma 4.1, we show that the games dened in this way are in a sense extreme in terms of the
liquid price of anarchy of a mechanismM . Particularly for the above example, this is the one with worst
liquid price of anarchy among all games induced by the Kelly mechanism which have the signal vector
s ∈ Xn as the worst equilibrium. en (in Lemma 4.2), an upper bound on the liquid price of anarchy
of a mechanism is obtained by taking the supremum of the bounds implied by Lemma 4.1 over all signal
vectors of Xn. Under mild assumptions, this bound is tight; Lemma 4.3 provides sucient conditions for
this.
5Note that the quantity ∂g
M
i (y,s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=si
is strictly positive for every s ∈ Xn.
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Lemma 4.1. Let GM1 be an n-player resource allocation game that is induced by a mechanism M with
LPoA(GM1 ) > 1. Let s ∈ Xn be an equilibrium of GM1 of minimum liquid welfare. en, there exists an
integer i∗ ∈ [n] such that
LPoA(GM1 ) ≤
LW(x˜,GM (s, i∗))
LW(gM (s),GM (s, i∗)) =
∑
i 6=i∗ p
M
i (s) + λ
M
i∗ (s)∑
i 6=i∗ p
M
i (s) + λ
M
i∗ (s) · gMi∗ (s)
,
where x˜ = (x˜1, ..., x˜n) denotes the allocation with x˜i∗ = 1 and x˜i = 0 for i 6= i∗.
Proof. Consider an n-player resource allocation game GM1 that is induced by mechanismM . Let vi and ci
be the valuation function and budget of player i, respectively. Let s ∈ Xn be the equilibrium of game GM1
of minimum liquid welfare. We denote by x the optimal allocation in GM1 . Without loss of generality, we
assume that, for every player i, xi = 0 if vi(0) > ci and vi(xi) ≤ ci otherwise, and we relax the allocation
denition to
∑n
i=1 xi ≤ 1; this does not constrain the optimal liquid welfare which is LW(x,GM1 ) =∑
i min{vi(xi), ci}. We use di = gMi (s) for the resource fraction allocated to player i in s; let d =
(d1, ..., dn).
We partition the players into the following three sets:
• Set A consists of players i with vi(di) < ci and signal si such that the derivative of their utility is
equal to 0.
• Set B consists of players i with signal si = 0 (hence, di = 0) and negative utility derivative such
that vi(0) < ci.
• Set Γ consists of players i with signal si such that vi(di) ≥ ci.
First, observe that sets A and B cannot be both empty, since it would then be LW(d,GM1 ) =∑
i∈[n] ci ≥ LW(x,GM1 ), and the liquid price of anarchy of GM1 would be exactly 1, contradicting the
assumption of the lemma. So, in the following, we assume that at least one of A and B is non-empty.
Now consider the games GM (s, j) for j ∈ [n] and let i∗ = arg maxj∈A∪B{λMj (s)}. We will show that
LW(d,GM1 ) ≥ LW(d,GM (s, i∗)) (1)
and we will furthermore show that the allocation x˜ satises
LW(x,GM1 )− LW(x˜,GM (s, i∗)) ≤ LW(d,GM1 )− LW(d,GM (s, i∗)). (2)
In this way (recall that s is the equilibrium of minimum liquid welfare in game GM1 and d is the resulting
allocation), we will have
LPoA(GM1 ) =
LW(x,GM1 )
LW(d,GM1 )
≤ LW(x,G
M
1 )− (LW(x,GM1 )− LW(x˜,GM (s, i∗)))
LW(d,GM1 )− (LW(d,GM1 )− LW(d,GM (s, i∗)))
=
LW(x˜,GM (s, i∗))
LW(d,GM (s, i∗))
=
∑
i 6=i∗ p
M
i (s) + λ
M
i∗ (s)∑
i 6=i∗ p
M
i (s) + λ
M
i∗ (s) · gMi∗ (s)
,
10
as desired. e inequality follows by (1) and (2). In particular, we remove the non-negative quan-
tity LW(d,GM1 ) − LW(d,GM (s, i∗)) from the denominator, and the smaller quantity LW(x,GM1 ) −
LW(x˜,GM (s, i∗)) from the enumerator; observe that the laer might be negative, and hence (2) is not
enough by itself to yield the desired inequality. e last equality follows since all players in GM (s, i∗)
besides i∗ have always their value capped by their budget, which is equal to their payment.
Inequality (1) is due to the fact that the contribution of each player to the liquid welfare at s can only
decrease between the two games. Indeed, if player i∗ belongs to B, she has zero value in game GM (s, i∗).
If she belongs to A, then her utility derivative is nullied and, hence, v′i∗(di∗) = λMi∗ (s). Due to the
concavity of vi∗ and since vi∗(0) ≥ 0, we get vi∗(di∗) ≥ di∗v′i∗(di∗) = di∗λMi∗ (s) = v˜i∗(di∗). Moreover,
the contribution of player i 6= i∗ in LW(d,GM (s, i∗)) is c˜i = pMi (s) which is at most her contribution
min{vi(di), ci} in LW(d,GM1 ) since the payment of player i cannot exceed her budget in GM1 and her
utility at equilibrium s is non-negative. See Figure 2 for a graphical representation of valuation functions
and budgets in games GM1 and GM (s, i∗).
Let
δ(i) = min{vi(xi), ci} −min{v˜i(x˜i), c˜i} −min{vi(di), ci}+ min{v˜i(di), c˜i}
denote the contribution of player i to the expression
LW(x,GM1 )− LW(x˜,GM (s, i∗))− LW(d,GM1 ) + LW(d,GM (s, i∗)).
en, in order to prove inequality (2) it suces to prove that
∑
i δ(i) ≤ 0.
• For player i∗, we have that vi∗(di∗) < ci∗ . Using the inequality vi∗(xi∗) ≤ vi∗(di∗) + v′i∗(di∗)(xi∗ −
di∗) due to the concavity of the valuation function vi∗ and the fact x˜i∗ = 1, we have that
δ(i∗) = min{vi∗(xi∗), ci∗} − λMi∗ (s)x˜i∗ − vi∗(di∗) + λMi∗ (s)di∗
≤ vi∗(xi∗)− λMi∗ (s)− vi∗(di∗) + λMi∗ (s)di∗
≤ v′i∗(di∗)(xi∗ − di∗)− λMi∗ (s) + λMi∗ (s)di∗ .
Now, we observe that (for such observations, we follow the reasoning in the caption of Figure 2) if
player i∗ belongs to A, then λMi∗ (s) = v′i∗(di∗), while if she belongs to B, then λMi∗ (s) ≥ v′i∗(di∗)
and di∗ = 0. In any case, we have that v′i∗(di∗)(xi∗ − di∗) ≤ λMi∗ (s)(xi∗ − di∗), and we obtain
δ(i∗) ≤ λMi∗ (s)(xi∗ − 1). (3)
• For all players i 6= i∗, observe that their value is always capped by their budget in GM (s, i∗). Also,
recall that vi(di) < ci for every i ∈ A ∪B and vi(di) ≥ ci for i ∈ Γ in game GM1 . For player i 6= i∗
belonging toA or toB we have that either λMi (s) = v′i(di) (if i ∈ A), or λMi (s) ≥ v′i(di) and di = 0
(if i ∈ B). Hence, using the concavity of vi and the fact that x˜i = 0, we obtain that
δ(i) ≤ vi(xi)− c˜i − vi(di) + c˜i
≤ vi(di) + λMi (s)(xi − di)− vi(di)
≤ λMi∗ (s)xi, (4)
where the last inequality follows since λMi (s) ≤ λMi∗ (s), due to the denition of player i∗. Otherwise,
if i ∈ Γ, we have
δ(i) = min{vi(xi), ci} − c˜i − ci + c˜i ≤ 0. (5)
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0 di∗ 1
0
vi∗(di∗)
ci∗
c˜i∗ = +∞
vi∗(z)
v˜i∗(z)
i∗ ∈ A
0 di 1
0
c˜i = p
M
i (s)
vi(di)
ci
vi(z)
v˜i(z)
i ∈ A
di∗ = 0 1
vi∗(di∗)
ci∗
c˜i∗ = +∞
vi∗(z)
v˜i∗(z)
i∗ ∈ B
di = 0 1
c˜i = p
M
i (s) = 0
vi(di)
ci vi(z)
v˜i(z)
i ∈ B
di = 0 1
c˜i = p
M
i (s) = 0
ci
vi(di)
vi(z)
v˜i(z)
i ∈ Γ
case 1
0 di 1
0
c˜i = p
M
i (s)
ci
vi(di)
vi(z)
v˜i(z)
i ∈ Γ
case 2
0 di 1
0
c˜i = p
M
i (s) = ci
vi(di)
vi(z)
v˜i(z)
i ∈ Γ
case 3
Figure 2: Relation between the two games GM1 and GM (s, i∗) that are used in the proof of Lemma 4.1; the
blue lines correspond to the valuation functions of the players in GM1 , while the red ones correspond to
GM (s, i∗). e dashed line is the tangent of vi at di. e slope λMi (s) of the ane valuation function of
player i in GM (s, i∗) is greater than (third, fourth, and h plot), equal to (rst, second, and sixth plot), or
smaller than (last plot) v′i(di) depending on whether the utility derivative of the player is negative, zero, or
positive, respectively (in particular, these are the three cases identied in the plots for i ∈ Γ). is follows
by the denition of games GM1 and GM (s, i∗) and the fact that, as the utility of player i in game GM1 has
derivative v′i(di)
∂gMi (y,s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=si
− ∂pMi (y,s−i)∂y
∣∣∣
y=si
at equilibrium, the sign of this derivative coincides with
the sign of v′i(di)− λMi (s).
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Hence, summing over all players, and using inequalities (3), (4) and (5) as well as the fact that
∑
i xi ≤ 1,
we obtain
∑
i δ(i) ≤ 0, and the proof is complete.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Lemma 4.2. Let M be an n-player resource allocation mechanism with allocation and payment functions
gM and pM , respectively. en, its liquid price of anarchy is
LPoA(M) ≤ sup
s∈Xn
{ ∑
i≥2 p
M
i (s) + λ
M
1 (s)∑
i≥2 p
M
i (s) + λ
M
1 (s) g
M
1 (s)
}
, (6)
where
λM1 (s) =
(
∂gM1 (y, s−1)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
)−1
· ∂p
M
1 (y, s−1)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
.
If, in addition, for all s ∈ Xn, s is an equilibrium of game GM (s, 1), then (6) holds with equality.
Proof. Using the denition of the liquid price of anarchy, Lemma 4.1, and the anonymity of resource allo-
cation mechanisms, we have
LPoA(M) = sup
GM
LPoA(GM )
= sup
GM
sup
s∈eq(GM )
LW∗(GM )
LW(gM (s),GM )
= sup
s∈Xn
sup
GM :s∈eq(GM )
LW∗(GM )
LW(gM (s),GM )
≤ sup
s∈Xn
max
i∗∈[n]
∑
i 6=i∗ p
M
i (s) + λ
M
i∗ (s)∑
i 6=i∗ p
M
i (s) + λ
M
i∗ (s) g
M
i∗ (s)
= sup
s∈Xn
∑
i≥2 p
M
i (s) + λ
M
1 (s)∑
i≥2 p
M
i (s) + λ
M
1 (s) g
M
1 (s)
.
Now, if s ∈ eq(GM (s, 1)) for every s ∈ Xn, by just considering the games GM (s, 1) induced bymechanism
M , we have
LPoA(M) ≥ sup
s∈Xn
LPoA(GM (s, 1))
≥ sup
s∈Xn
∑
i≥2 p
M
i (s) + λ
M
1 (s)∑
i≥2 p
M
i (s) + λ
M
1 (s) g
M
1 (s)
and (6) holds with equality. e last inequality follows by comparing the liquid welfare at s to the liquid
welfare of the allocation which gives the whole resource to player 1. Recall that all players besides player
1 have always their value capped by their budget in game GM (s, 1).
Lemma 4.2 is extremely powerful. It essentially says that no game-theoretic reasoning is needed any-
more for proving upper bounds on the LPoA and, instead, all we have to do is to solve the corresponding
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mathematical program. Furthermore, it can be used to prove lower bounds on the LPoA without providing
any explicit construction. In this case, we just need to show that the condition s ∈ eq(GM (s, 1)) holds;
then the tight lower bound follows by solving the same mathematical program.
Beforewe continuewith the rest of our results, we dene the class C ofmechanismsM that use concave
allocation functions gM and convex payment functions pM . Observe that both Kelly and SH (as well as
the E2-PYS mechanism presented in Section 6) are members of this class. With our next lemma, we prove
that the condition s ∈ eq(GM (s, 1)) is satised for any C mechanismM . is will allow us to prove lower
bounds in the upcoming sections.
Lemma 4.3. For any n-player resource allocation mechanismM ∈ C and s ∈ Xn, s ∈ eq(GM (s, 1)).
Proof. Consider any mechanismM ∈ C that uses a concave allocation function gM and a convex payment
function pM . By the denition of game GM (s, 1), the utility of any player i, as a function of her signal y,
is uMi (y, s−i) = λMi (s) · gMi (y, s−i) + κMi (s)− pMi (y, s−i) and its derivative is
∂uMi (y, s−i)
∂y
= λMi (s)
∂gMi (y, s−i)
∂y
− ∂p
M
i (y, s−i)
∂y
.
Observe that, by the denition of λMi (s), the signal si nullies the utility derivative of player i. Further-
more,
∂2uMi (y, s−i)
∂y2
= λMi (s)
∂2gMi (y, s−i)
∂y2
− ∂
2pMi (y, s−i)
∂y2
≤ 0,
for every y such that (y, s−i) ∈ Xn (i.e., uMi (y, s−i) is a concave function). Hence, the signal si actually
maximizes the player’s utility.
5 Pay-your-signal mechanisms
In this section, we will exploit Lemma 4.2 to prove tight bounds on the liquid price of anarchy of the Kelly
and SH mechanisms. Our LPoA bounds are 2 for Kelly (eorem 5.1) and 3 for SH (eorems 5.2 and 5.3).
Recall that both of these mechanisms belong to class C and, by Lemma 4.3, the condition s ∈ eq(GM (s, 1))
is satised.
eorem 5.1. e liquid price of anarchy of the Kelly mechanism is 2.
Proof. Consider any signal vector s ∈ Xn, and let C =
∑
i≥2 si. Since Kelly is a PYS mechanism, we have
that
∑
i≥2 p
Kelly
i (s) = C and
∂p
Kelly
1 (y, s−1)
∂y
= 1.
By the denition of the allocation function gKelly1 (y, s−1) =
y
y+C , we have that
∂g
Kelly
1 (y, s−1)
∂y
=
C
(y + C)2
.
Also, since the mechanism belongs to class C, by Lemma 4.3, we have that s ∈ eq(GKelly(s, 1)). Hence,
λ
Kelly
1 (s) =
(s1 + C)
2
C
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and Lemma 4.2 yields
LPoA(Kelly) = sup
s1,C≥0
C + (s1 + C)
2/C
C + (s1 + C)s1/C
= sup
s1,C≥0
2C2 + 2s1C + s
2
1
C2 + s1C + s21
= sup
s1,C≥0
(
2− s
2
1
C2 + s1C + s21
)
= 2,
as desired.
Notice that our proof of eorem 5.1 is surprisingly short. e proof exploits Lemma 4.2 with (6)
holding with equality and, as such, it simultaneously provides a tight (upper and lower) bound. In contrast,
our analysis for the SH mechanism is slightly more involved. is is mainly due to the more complicated
denition of the allocation function (see Section 2), which requires us to distinguish between two cases,
depending on whether s1 < max` s` or not. Both cases lead to inequalities that provide only an upper
bound on the LPoA of SH in the proof of eorem 5.2. In eorem 5.3, we easily prove a matching lower
bound by restricting our aention to the 2-player version of the mechanism. Actually, the proof can be
thought of as providing a tight (i.e., not only lower, but also upper) bound on the LPoA of the 2-player
version of the SH mechanism.
eorem 5.2. e liquid price of anarchy of the SH mechanism is at most 3.
Proof. Wewill use Lemma 4.2 and upper-bound the ratio in the RHS of (6) by 3. DeneC =
∑
i≥2 si. First,
let s ∈ Xn with s1 < max` s`. Let arg max` s` = i∗ 6= 1. en, by the denition of SH and the denition
of λSH1 (s) in (6), we have
λSH1 (s) =
si∗∫ 1
0
∏
i≥2
(
1− sisi∗ t
)
dt
(7)
and using the Bernoulli inequality stating that 1− γt ≥ (1− t)γ for t ≤ 1 and γ ∈ [0, 1], (7) yields
λSH1 (s) ≤
si∗∫ 1
0
∏
i≥2 (1− t)
si
si∗ dt
=
si∗∫ 1
0 (1− t)
C
si∗ dt
= si∗ + C.
Since SH is PYS,
∑
i≥2 p
SH
i (s) = C . Using this observation together with the last inequality, we obtain∑
i≥2 p
SH
i (s) + λ
SH
1 (s)∑
i≥2 p
SH
i (s) + λ
SH
1 (s) g
SH
1 (s)
≤ 2C + si∗
C
≤ 3. (8)
e inequalities follow since λSH1 (s) gSH1 (s) ≥ 0, s1 ≥ 0, and si∗ ≤ C .
Now, let s ∈ Xn with s1 = max` s`. In this case, gSH1 (s) is dened as
gSH1 (s) =
∫ 1
0
∏
i≥2
(
1− si
s1
t
)
dt
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and
∂gSH1 (y, s−1)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
=
∫ 1
0
∑
i≥2
si
s21
t
∏
j 6=1,i
(
1− sj
s1
t
)
dt
≥
∑
i≥2
si
s21
∫ 1
0
t
∏
j 6=1,i
(1− t)
sj
s1 dt
=
∑
i≥2
si
s21
∫ 1
0
t(1− t)
C−si
s1 dt
=
∑
i≥2
si
(C − si + s1)(C − si + 2s1)
≥ C
(C + s1)(C + 2s1)
.
Using the denition of λSH1 (s) in (6), this last inequality implies that
λSH1 (s) ≤
(C + s1)(C + 2s1)
C
. (9)
Also, by applying the Bernoulli inequality to the RHS of the denition of gSH1 (s), we obtain
gSH1 (s) ≥
∫ 1
0
∏
i≥2
(1− t)
si
s1 dt =
∫ 1
0
(1− t) Cs1 dt = s1
C + s1
. (10)
Now, we have ∑
i≥2 p
SH
i (s) + λ
SH
1 (s)∑
i≥2 p
SH
i (s) + λ
SH
1 (s) g
SH
1 (s)
≤ C
2 + (C + s1)(C + 2s1)
C2 + (C + s1)(C + 2s1) g
SH
1 (s)
≤ 2C
2 + 3s1C + 2s
2
1
C2 + s1C + 2s21
≤ 3. (11)
e two rst inequalities follow by (9) and (10), respectively, and the last one is obvious since s1, C ≥ 0.
Now, the upper bound follows by Lemma 4.2 using (8) and (11).
eorem 5.3. e liquid price of anarchy of the SH mechanism is at least 3.
Proof. It suces to restrict our aention to the 2-player version of the mechanism. Let s ∈ X2 with
s1 ≤ s2. In this case gSH1 (s) = s12s2 which implies that λSH1 (s) = 2s2. Since the SH mechanism belongs to
class C, by Lemma 4.3, we have that s ∈ eq(GSH(s, 1)). Using Lemma 4.2, we obtain
LPoA(SH) ≥ sup
s∈X2:s1≤s2
3s2
s2 + s1
= 3.
e proof is complete.
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6 Two-player mechanisms
As we saw in eorem 5.1, the Kelly mechanism has an LPoA of exactly 2 even in the case of two players.
In contrast, our lower bound of 3/2 for 2-player mechanisms in eorem 3.1 seems to leave room for
improvements. Such improvements are indeed possible as we show with the mechanisms that we present
in this section. Interestingly, the E2-PYS mechanism that is dened in the following is also proved to have
optimal LPoA among all 2-player PYS mechanisms with concave allocation functions.
6.1 e E2-PYS mechanism
Let β ≈ 1.792 be the solution of the equation 1β − 1β exp
(
− ββ−1
)
= 12 and dene mechanism E2-PYS to
be the PYS 2-player mechanism that uses the allocation function
gE2-PYSi (s) =

1
β − 1β exp
(
− ββ−1 · sis3−i
)
si ≤ s3−i
β−1
β +
1
β exp
(
− ββ−1 · s3−isi
)
si > s3−i
for player i ∈ {1, 2} and (non-zero) signal vector s = (s1, s2). Due to the denition of β, E2-PYS is a well-
dened resource allocation mechanism: it is anonymous, with an increasing and dierentiable allocation
function, which allocates the whole resource when some player has non-zero signal. Moreover, E2-PYS
belongs to class C: the allocation function can be seen to be concave (see also Figure 3) and the payment
function is, of course, convex. e LPoA bound statement for E2-PYS follows.
eorem 6.1. e liquid price of anarchy of the E2-PYS mechanism is β ≈ 1.792.
Proof. We will prove the theorem using Lemma 4.2. Let s ∈ X2. Due to Lemma 4.3, we have that s ∈
eq(GE2-PYS(s, 1)). Since E2-PYS is a PYS mechanism, we have that pE2-PYS1 (s) = s1, which yields
∂pE2-PYS1 (y, s2)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
= 1.
Next, we distinguish between two cases. First, assume that s1 ≤ s2; in this case, the allocation of player 1
is
gE2-PYS1 (s1, s2) =
1
β
− 1
β
exp
(
− β
β − 1 ·
s1
s2
)
and, thus, the derivative is equal to
∂gE2-PYS1 (y, s2)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
=
1
(β − 1)s2 exp
(
− β
β − 1 ·
s1
s2
)
.
erefore, λE2-PYS1 (s) is dened as
λE2-PYS1 (s) =
(
∂gE2-PYSi (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=si
)−1
· ∂p
E2-PYS
i (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=si
= (β − 1)s2 exp
(
β
β − 1 ·
s1
s2
)
.
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By substituting pE2-PYS2 (s), λE2-PYS1 (s), and gE2-PYS1 (s) in (6), we obtain
pE2-PYS2 (s) + λ
E2-PYS
1 (s)
pE2-PYS2 (s) + λ
E2-PYS
1 (s) g
E2-PYS
1 (s)
=
s2 + (β − 1)s2 exp
(
β
β−1 · s1s2
)
s2 +
β−1
β s2 exp
(
β
β−1 · s1s2
)(
1− exp
(
− ββ−1 · s1s2
)) = β. (12)
For the second case where s1 > s2, we have that
gE2-PYS1 (s1, s2) =
β − 1
β
+
1
β
exp
(
− β
β − 1 ·
s2
s1
)
and
∂gE2-PYS1 (y, s2)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
=
s2
(β − 1)s21
exp
(
− β
β − 1 ·
s2
s1
)
.
Now, it is
λE2-PYS1 (s) =
(
∂gE2-PYSi (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=si
)−1
· ∂p
E2-PYS
i (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=si
=
(β − 1)s21
s2
exp
(
β
β − 1 ·
s2
s1
)
By substituting pE2-PYS2 (s), λE2-PYS1 (s), and gE2-PYS1 (s) in (6), we obtain
pE2-PYS2 (s) + λ
E2-PYS
1 (s)
pE2-PYS2 (s) + λ
E2-PYS
1 (s) g
E2-PYS
1 (s)
=
s2 +
(β−1)s21
s2
exp
(
β
β−1 · s2s1
)
s2 +
(β−1)s21
s2
exp
(
β
β−1 · s2s1
)
·
(
β−1
β +
1
β exp
(
− ββ−1 · s2s1
))
=
s2 +
(β−1)s21
s2
exp
(
β
β−1 · s2s1
)
s2 +
(β−1)2
β
s21
s2
exp
(
β
β−1 · s2s1
)
+ β−1β
s21
s2
= β
1 + (β − 1)
(
s1
s2
)2
exp
(
β
β−1 · s2s1
)
β + (β − 1)2
(
s1
s2
)2
exp
(
β
β−1 · s2s1
)
+ (β − 1)
(
s1
s2
)2 ≤ β. (13)
e inequality follows since the quantity at its le is decreasing in s1/s2 (its derivative with respect to
s1/s2 can be shown by tedious calculations to be non-positive for s1/s2 ≥ 1) and, hence, it is upper-
bounded by its value for s1/s2 = 1; this is equal to β by its denition.
e theorem follows by Lemma 4.2 using (12) and (13).
We remark that a preliminary analysis similar to the rst half of the proof of eorem 6.1 inspired
the design of the E2-PYS mechanism (as well as that of the E2-SR mechanism that is dened later) at rst
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place. By keeping the allocation function as the unknown and requiring that the RHS of (6) is equal to some
value α for all signal vectors s ∈ X2 with s1 ≤ s2 (this is essentially what (12) captures), we obtained a
rst-order dierential equation which, using the appropriate conditions so that the resulting mechanism
is valid, led to E2-PYS (for α = β). Luckily, for signal vectors s ∈ X2 with s1 > s2, we were able to show
that the RHS of (6) is at most α; see inequality (13).
We now show that E2-PYS has optimal LPoA among 2-player PYS mechanisms in class C. e proof
makes use of Lemma 4.2 and a simple dierential inequality that involves the allocation function.
eorem 6.2. Any 2-player PYS mechanism with a concave allocation function has liquid price of anarchy
at least β ≈ 1.792.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists a PYS mechanismM that has liquid price of
anarchy β′ < β. Denote by f : R≥0 → [0, 1] the function dened as f(y) = gM1 (y, 1). en, by applying
Lemma 4.2 with s = (y, 1) ∈ X2 to M we have λM1 (y, 1) = 1/f ′(y) and LPoA(M) ≥ 1+1/f
′(y)
1+f(y)/f ′(y) for
every y ∈ [0, 1]. By our assumption LPoA(M) ≤ β′, we get the dierential inequality
(β′ − 1)f ′(y) + β′f(y) ≥ 1
for every y ∈ [0, 1]. Using Gro¨nwall’s inequality, f(y) is lower-bounded by the solution of the correspond-
ing dierential equation. Due to the condition f(0) = 0, this yields
f(y) ≥ 1
β′
− 1
β′
exp
(
− β
′
β′ − 1y
)
and, hence,
1
2
= f(1) ≥ 1
β′
− 1
β′
exp
(
− β
′
β′ − 1
)
>
1
β
− 1
β
exp
(
− β
β − 1
)
,
which contradicts the denition of β. e last inequality follows since the function 1z − 1z exp
(
− zz−1
)
is
decreasing in the interval [1, 2].
6.2 e E2-SR mechanism
Let us now dene a non-PYS mechanism that has considerably beer LPoA than E2-PYS and almost
matches the lower bound of 3/2 fromeorem 3.1 for 2-player mechanisms. Let γ ≈ 1.529 be the solution
of the equation 1γ − 1γ exp
(
− γ2(γ−1)
)
= 12 and dene mechanism E2-SR to be the 2-player mechanism
that uses the allocation function (see Figure 3 for a comparison of the allocation functions of Kelly, SH,
E2-PYS, and E2-SR)
gE2-SRi (s) =

1
γ − 1γ exp
(
− γ2(γ−1) ·
(
si
s3−i
)2)
si ≤ s3−i
γ−1
γ +
1
γ exp
(
− γ2(γ−1) ·
(
s3−i
si
)2)
si > s3−i
and the payment function pE2-SRi (s) = si/s3−i for player i ∈ {1, 2} and (non-zero) signal vector s =
(s1, s2). By the general conventions of Section 2, the payments are 0 when some of the signals are equal to
zero. Due to the denition of γ, E2-SR is a well-dened resource allocation mechanism. However, observe
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Figure 3: A comparison of the allocation function gMi used by E2-PYS (in green), (the 2-player version
of) Kelly (in blue), SH (dashed), and E2-SR (in red) as a function of si/s3−i for si ≤ s3−i. Among these
mechanisms, E2-SR is the only one with a non-concave allocation function.
that E2-SR does not belong to class C (the allocation function is not concave; see Figure 3) and the condition
s ∈ eq(GE2-SR(s, 1)) is not guaranteed to be satised. Next, we will prove an upper bound on the LPoA
of E2-SR. e proof follows in a similar way to the proof of eorem 6.1, but it does not provide a tight
bound.
eorem 6.3. e liquid price of anarchy of the E2-SR mechanism is at most γ ≈ 1.529.
Proof. We will prove the theorem by mimicking the proof of eorem 6.1. Let s ∈ X2. Again, we distin-
guish between two cases. First, assume that s1 ≤ s2. en, since
gE2-SR1 (s1, s2) =
1
γ
− 1
γ
exp
(
− γ
2(γ − 1) ·
(
s1
s2
)2)
,
the derivative of the allocation for player 1 is
∂gE2-SR1 (y, s2)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
=
s1
(γ − 1)s22
exp
(
− γ
2(γ − 1) ·
(
s1
s2
)2)
.
Also, since the payment function used by E2-SR is equal to the signal ratio, its derivative for player 1 is
∂pE2-SR1 (y, s2)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
=
1
s2
.
erefore,
λE2-SR1 (s) =
(
∂gE2-SRi (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=si
)−1
· ∂p
E2-SR
i (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=si
= (γ − 1)s2
s1
exp
(
γ
2(γ − 1) ·
(
s1
s2
)2)
.
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By substituting pE2-SR2 (s), λE2-SR1 (s), and gE2-SR1 (s) to (6), we can now easily verify that
pE2-SR2 (s) + λ
E2-SR
1 (s)
pE2-SR2 (s) + λ
E2-SR
1 (s) g
E2-SR
1 (s)
= γ. (14)
For the second case where s1 > s2, the allocation is dened as
gE2-SR1 (s1, s2) =
γ − 1
γ
+
1
γ
exp
(
− γ
2(γ − 1) ·
(
s2
s1
)2)
and the derivative is
∂gE2-SR1 (y, s2)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
=
s22
(γ − 1)s31
exp
(
− γ
2(γ − 1) ·
(
s2
s1
)2)
.
e payment derivative is again equal to 1/s2 and, hence,
λE2-SR1 (s) =
(
∂gE2-SRi (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=si
)−1
· ∂p
E2-SR
i (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=si
= (γ − 1)
(
s1
s2
)3
exp
(
γ
2(γ − 1) ·
(
s2
s1
)2)
.
By substituting pE2-SR2 (s), λE2-SR1 (s), and gE2-SR1 (s), we obtain
pE2-SR2 (s) + λ
E2-SR
1 (s)
pE2-SR2 (s) + λ
E2-SR
1 (s) g
E2-SR
1 (s)
=
s2
s1
+ (γ − 1)
(
s1
s2
)3
exp
(
γ
2(γ−1) ·
(
s2
s1
)2)
s2
s1
+ (γ − 1)
(
s1
s2
)3
exp
(
γ
2(γ−1) ·
(
s2
s1
)2) · (γ−1γ + 1γ exp(− γ2(γ−1) · ( s2s1)2))
= γ
1 + (γ − 1)
(
s1
s2
)4
exp
(
γ
2(γ−1) ·
(
s2
s1
)2)
γ + (γ − 1)2
(
s1
s2
)4
exp
(
γ
2(γ−1) ·
(
s2
s1
)2)
+ (γ − 1)
(
s1
s2
)4 ≤ γ. (15)
e inequality follows because the quantity at its le is decreasing in s1/s2 (its derivative with respect
to s1/s2 can be shown by tedious calculations to be non-positive for s1/s2 ≥ 1) and, hence, it is upper-
bounded by its value for s1/s2 = 1; this is equal to γ by its denition.
e theorem follows by Lemma 4.2 using (14) and (15).
6.3 e SH-SR mechanism
Interestingly, we now show that there exists a simple 2-player mechanism that is part of class C and
achieves a tight LPoA equal to the golden ratio φ ≈ 1.618, improving upon the bound of 1.792 achieved
by E2-PYS for mechanisms in C. is mechanism uses the allocation function of SH and the signal-ratio
payment function of E2-SR. In the following, we will refer to this 2-player mechanism as SH-SR.
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eorem 6.4. e liquid price of anarchy of the SH-SR mechanism is φ ≈ 1.618.
Proof. Again, we will prove the theorem using Lemma 4.2. Let s ∈ X2. Due to Lemma 4.3, since the
allocation function is concave and the payment function is convex, we have that s ∈ eq(GSH-SR(s, 1)). By
the denition of the payment function, we have that pSH-SR1 (s) = s1s2 , which yields that
∂pSH-SR1 (y, s2)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
=
1
s2
.
Next, we distinguish between two cases. First, assume that s1 ≤ s2. en, the allocation of player 1 is
gSH-SR1 (s1, s2) =
s1
2s2
, which yields that
∂gSH-SR1 (y, s2)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
=
1
2s2
.
erefore, λSH-SR1 (s) = 2. By seing z = s1s2 , and substituting p
SH-SR
2 (s), λSH-SR1 (s), and gSH-SR1 (s) in (6), we
obtain
pSH-SR2 (s) + λ
SH-SR
1 (s)
pSH-SR2 (s) + λ
SH-SR
1 (s) g
SH-SR
1 (s)
=
s22 + 2s1s2
s22 + s
2
1
=
1 + 2z
1 + z2
≤ φ. (16)
e inequality follows since the maximum value of the expression 1+2z
1+z2
is φ, which occurs at z = φ− 1.
For the second case where s1 > s2, since g1(s1, s2) = 1− s22s1 , we have that
∂gSH-SR1 (y, s2)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
=
s2
2s21
and, therefore, λSH-SR1 (s) = 2
(
s1
s2
)2
. By seing z = s2s1 , and substituting p
SH-SR
2 (s), λSH-SR1 (s), and gSH-SR1 (s)
in (6), we obtain
pSH-SR2 (s) + λ
SH-SR
1 (s)
pSH-SR2 (s) + λ
SH-SR
1 (s) g
SH-SR
1 (s)
=
s2
s1
+ 2
(
s1
s2
)2
s2
s1
+ 2
(
s1
s2
)2 (
1− s22s1
)
= 1 +
z
z3 − z + 2 ≤ φ. (17)
Here, the inequality follows since the maximum value of the expression z
z3−z+2 is 1/2, which occurs for
z = 1.
e theorem follows by Lemma 4.2 using (16) and (17).
7 Open problems and possible extensions
Even though we have revealed an almost complete picture on the liquid price of anarchy of resource
allocation mechanisms, our work leaves an interesting open problem: is the 2− 1/n bound achievable (as
opposed to 2), preferably by a simple mechanism? In particular, is there a mechanism with a proportional
allocation function and appropriate non-PYS payments that achieves this LPoA bound? is question
seems technically challenging even for the case of two players only.
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Regarding the liquid price of anarchy over more general equilibrium concepts (e.g., correlated equi-
libria) or seings with incomplete information (and Bayes-Nash equilibria), is the Kelly mechanism still
optimal within low-order terms? We are far from answering this question. e papers by Caragiannis and
Voudouris [2016] and byChristodoulou et al. [2016] present LPoA bounds for Kelly, but these are not known
to be tight. We conjecture that the proof of tight LPoA bounds over more general equilibrium concepts
for any resource allocation mechanism should exploit the structure of worst-case games and equilibria as
we did in the current paper for pure Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, extending our characterization from
Section 4 to more general equilibrium concepts seems elusive at this point.
ere are several interesting extensions of our seing that could be considered. Budget-aware mecha-
nisms, which have access to the budget value of each player, constitute a rst such extension. Of course,
our analysis for mechanisms Kelly, SH, E2-PYS, and E2-SR carries over to this case. In contrast, our lower
bound (eorem 3.1) is not true anymore. e proof constructs two games, in which almost every player
has dierent budgets. e main property we have exploited in that proof (for non-budget-aware mecha-
nisms) is that the strategic behavior of the players results in the same set of equilibria in both games. is
argument fails for budget-aware mechanisms; a small change in the budget of a single player could be
enough to alter the set of equilibria. So, in principle, one might hope even for full eciency at equilibria
(i.e., LPoA equal to 1) in this case, analogously to the results of Maheswaran and Basar [2006], Johari and
Tsitsiklis [2009], and Yang and Hajek [2007] in the no-budget seing. Interestingly, our next statement
rules out this possibility.
eorem 7.1. For n ≥ 2, every n-player budget-aware resource allocation mechanism has liquid price of
anarchy at least 4/3.
Proof. LetM be anyn-player budget-aware resource allocationmechanism that uses an allocation function
gM and a payment function pM . Let s = (s1, ..., sn) be an equilibrium of the game GM1 induced byM for
players with valuations vi(x) = x for i ∈ {1, 2} and vi(x) = 0 for i ≥ 3, and budgets ci = 1 for every
i ∈ [n]. Assume that the allocation returned byM at this equilibrium is d = (d1, ..., dn). Without loss of
generality, we may assume that one of the rst two players (say, player 1) gets a resource share of at most
1/2.
Recall that, for every signal vector y, the utility of any player i is dened as uMi (y) = vi(gMi (y)) −
pMi (y). Now, consider the game GM2 where player 2 has the modied valuation function v˜2(x) = 1 +
x while all other players are as in GM1 ; the budgets are the same in both games and are known to the
mechanism. Observe that themodied utility of player 2 is now u˜M2 (y) = v˜2(gM2 (y))−pM2 (y) = uM2 (y)+
1. Hence, s is an equilibrium in GM2 as well andM returns the same allocation d again.
Clearly, due to the denition of the valuation functions, the contribution of players i ≥ 3 in the liquid
welfare (in any state of the game) is zero. Hence, the liquid welfare at equilibrium is min{v˜1(d1), c1} +
min{v˜2(d2), c2} = d1 + 1 ≤ 3/2, while the optimal liquid welfare is equal to 2, achieved at the allocation
according to which the whole resource is given to player 1. We conclude that the liquid price of anarchy
ofM is LPoA(M) ≥ LPoA(GM2 ) ≥ 4/3, as desired.
In spite of the lower bound ineorem 7.1, whether budget-aware resource allocation mechanisms can
have an LPoA beer than 2−1/n is an important open problem. is seems to be a technically non-trivial
and extremely challenging task though.
Another possible extension of our seing could be to allow the players to declare their budgets to
the mechanism in addition to their scalar signal. Taking this approach to its extreme, one could imagine
resource allocation mechanisms which ask the players to submitmulti-dimensional signals. At rst glance,
this seems to lead to much more powerful mechanisms than the ones we have considered here (since
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a signal consisting of many scalars could allow a player to encode her valuation function and budget).
Surprisingly, this higher level of expressiveness [Du¨ing et al., 2019] has no consequences to the LPoA at all
and our lower bound of 2− 1/n captures such mechanisms as well. Indeed, by inspecting the two games
used in the proof of eorem 3.1, we can verify that the same signal vector (no maer whether signals
are single- or multi-dimensional) leads to the same allocation by the mechanism and the same strategic
behavior of the players in both games. is observation applies to the proof of eorem 7.1 as well.
Finally, we believe that the liquid welfare is an appropriate eciency benchmark for auctions with
budget-constrained players. e recent paper by Azar et al. [2017] studies the LPoA of simultaneous rst-
price auctions; obtaining similar results for other auction formats (e.g., see the recent survey of Rough-
garden et al. [2017]) is certainly important. Needless to say, we do not expect that the liquid welfare is
unique as a measure of eciency in seings with budgets. Dening alternative eciency benchmarks and
studying the price of anarchy with respect to them would shed extra light to the strengths and weaknesses
of auction mechanisms.
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